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Research Question 
•  Why are some countries more successful at 
convicting human traffickers than others? 
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Prior Research 
•  Lack of Comprehensive Anti-HT Laws 
      (Pearson 2002; Goodey 2004; Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009) 
 
•  Weak and Inefficient Institutions  
      (Craig 1983; Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009; Guth 2010) 
 
•  Lack of Victim Cooperation 
      (Anti-Slavery International 2002; Goodey 2004; Gallagher and Pearson 2010) 
 
•  Offender Demographics 
     (Mosher and Hagan 1994; Reynolds 2008) 
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Theory & Hypothesis 
Conformity 
of law 
Enforcement 
of law Convictions 
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H1:  The more ambiguous a country’s law is, the 
lower the likelihood of obtaining a human 
trafficking conviction. 
Research Design 
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! General' !Component! Parameter! Sample!Space! Country! 60!Time! 2007! !Unit!of!Analysis! Country! !! '
Operationalization'
!Concept! Variable! Source!Conformity! Anti=HT!Law! Cho!et!al.!(2011)!Volume!of!HT! Flow!of!HT! Bales!(2005)!Legal!Inequity! Inequity!in!Family!Law! WomanStats!Victim!Assistance! Protection! Cho!et!al.!(2011)!State!Capacity! Total!tax!%!GDP! World!Bank!Corruption! CPI! Transparency!Int’l!!Wealth! GDP!pc! World!Bank!Ratification!of!PP! Binary! UNODC!! ! !! '
Methodology'
!Logistic!Regression! ! !!!!!
Findings 
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Variable Odds Ratio Standard Error P-value 
Anti-trafficking law 13.378 10.976 0.002*** 
Volume of trafficking 1.822 1.079  0.311 
Inequity of family law 2.474 1.758 0.202 
Victim assistance 1.238 .722 0.714 
State capacity .922 .082 0.362 
Corruption 3.990 2.884 0.056* 
Wealth (GDP pc) 1.000 .000 0.139 
Ratify Palermo Protocol .607 1.178 0.797 
Note:  N = 60.  *p <0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. !
Conclusion 
•  Signature or ratification doesn’t imply 
enforcement 
 
•  HT definition matters at all levels 
•  Corruption may be another driving force 
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Questions or Suggestions? 
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